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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

FRANCES O'HAIR,
Plamtiff-A ppelloot,

Case No.

vs.
JOHN S. KOUNALIS and
GEORGE KOUNALIS,

11445

Defenda;nts-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Th:iis is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover
money allegedly loaned to both defendants more than five
and one-half years ( 5%) before the action was commenced. [R. 1]
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial judge granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment based uipon the deposition of the
parties [R. 7] ; and also entered an order denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the said judgment [R. 10]
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants ask that the judgment of the trial
judge be affirmed.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff '·s parents died when she was fourteen
(14) yeans of age and her aunt was appointed her legal
guardian. The aunt hired Mrs. Leone Small, who was the
defendant John S. Kounalis' mother-in-law to stay with
her. The aunt moved out, but Mr·s. Small -stayed on with
the plaintiff and her sister for about four ( 4) years and
until they graduated from high school in 1962. [Dep. Pl.
pp. 4-5] During this time, Mrs. Small and John Kounalis'
family were the closest thing to a real family the plaintiff
had. [Dep. JK p. 4]
The plaintiff and her sister each shared equally in
the family esta'te consisting of some cash as•sets ; a home
which sold for $21,000.00 and some inheritance from their
grandfather's estate. [Dep. Pl. p. 7, 38] The plaintiff's
share amounted to over $11,000.00 which she received
jUJst after she turned eighteen (18) in January, 1962.
[Dep. Pl. p. 8] By Aug11st of 1963, she had spent the
entire inheritance. [Dep. Pl. p. 35-36] During this
time, the defendant, John Kounalis, advised her not t-0
spend the money but rather to invest it. John stated she
seemed ito have an ohsession to get rid of her money and
refused to consider investments. [Dep. JK p. 16]
Af.ter the plaintiff turned eighteen (18), she began
to date George Kounalis who at that time was unmarried.
[Dep. GK p. 15 L. 25; p. 16 L. 1] George testified that
these dates averaged about once a week over ten months
from Oct. 1962 through July 1963. He stated the plaintiff would call him seeking out the date. [Dep. GK pp.
2
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10-11] John Kounalis stated the plaintiff was very much
love with Georrge. [Dep. JK p. 22] ; and the plaintiff

m

herself admitted she liked George and wanted to help him
out any way she could. [Dep. Pl. pp. 13-14]

Sometime in 1962, George Kounalis became involved
in criminal li1tigat,ion in California. The attorney's fees
and other cosfa of defending this action became important. George K<ounalis sold some of his stock to rai,se
about $2,500.00 to pay said ex'Penses [Dep. GK pp. 8-9]
At the time he was employed for Univac at Sperry Rand
in Salt Lake City, Utah. [Dep. GK p. 6] John testified
that George's nine (9) brothers and sisters could have
raised the remaining money to def end this action had it
been necessary to do so. [Dep. JK pp. 9-10]
However at about this same time, the plaintiff became aware of the circumstances and went directly to
John Kounalis offering to give him money to help
George. She conditioned the payment on the promise that
.John would not teU George where the money was coming
from. [Dep. JK p. 17 L. 6-10; p. 5 L. 18-23] John stated
the money was given as a gift because the plaintiff
thought quite a bi,t of George. [Dep. JK p. 12 L. 15-21]
At least two (2) clhecks were then written out to John
and deposited by John in his private bank account. John
would then write checks of a similar amount made out
to George. [Dep. JK pp. 6-7] John stated that he never
discussed with George anything about the plaintiff being
the one who made the advances; and he did not know how
George found out about it. [Dep. JK pp. 22-23]
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George testified that it was not until about March
of 1963 that he first learned that the plaintiff had ad~
vanced the money. [Dep. GK p. 10] This was after the
money had been given to John and also after John had
given the money to George. George further testified that
when he talked to the plaintiff about this matter she said
it was a gift and she didn't want to be repaid. [Dep. GK
p. 16] Ge,orge did remember receiving a check from John
in November, 1962 for about $500.00 and one in January,
1963 for about $1,500.00. [Dep. GK p. 7] He sold some
of the stocks after the first loan was received in N ovember, 1962; and of the $2,500.00 received from the sale, he
sent $1,000.00 to his attorney as a retainer and paid John
back $920.00. [Dep. GK p. 9]
The plaintiff's testimony agrees with these statements made by both John and George. She testified that
all monies were given to John and sib.e never had any
contact with Georg e. [Dep. PL pp. 12, 20-21] She
stated she could have given the money to George but he
never asked for it. [Dep. Pl. P. 13] She further stated
that she had no personal knowledge that George ever
received the money she gave to John; nor did she have
any personal knowledge that George knew she was the
ione advancing the money. [Dep. PL pp. 21, 24] She
stated unequivocably that George Kounalis neve·r did tell
1
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her the money would be repaid. [Dep. PL p. 29] The
p1aintiff admits that there were no written agreements
pertaining to these transactions but rather all of the
understandings were verbal. [Dep. PL p. 17]
4

Insofar as her dealings with John Kounalis were
eoncerned, the plaintiff stated she made advances to John
in October, 1962, and January, 1963. [Dep. PL pp. 9-10]
She states in one part of her deposition that John Kounalis said the money would be repaid in five or six (5 or
6) years. [Dep. PL p. 11] However, when asked later in
the deposition to state again what she remembered about
this initial conve,rsa,tion, she changed her testimony and
remarked that John said it might be two, three or four
(2, 3 or 4) years. [Dep. Pl. p. 18]
The plaintiff stated that by the summer of 1963, she
had gone through her entire inheritance and was in need
of help. [Dep. Pl. pp. 34-36] She went to John Kounalis
who owned a small neighborhood grocery store called the
Liberty Park Market and asked for some food. [Dep.
Pl. p. 34] John told her she could have anything she
wanted. [Dep. JK p. 18] This was a common practice
with the defendant, John Kounali.s, insofar as other
members of his family were c.oncerned; and many of
them had received help in the past. The plaintiff continued to receive assistance until about January, 1964, when
she moved from the neighborhood. [Dep. Pl. pp. 36, 40]
From January, 1964, until the complaint was filed in
August, 1968, the plaintiff never contacted the defendant
John Kounalis in any way either concerning the loan or
otherwise. [Dep. Bl. p. 36-37; Dep. JK p. 15 L. 1-3] The
plaintiff stated that she considered the receipt of groceries to be partial payment on the monies advanced to
John Kounalis ; however John denies that there was any
5

conversation to this effect. [Dep. JK p. 18]
The plaintiff further testified that George Kounalis
gave her $100.00 about this same period of time she was
receiving groceries from John. On page 9 of her brief,
the plaintiff states the time of year in 1964 when this
$100.00 was paid is not clear. However in her deposition
the plaintiff said it was while she wa'S still living in the
apartment on 5th East Street in Salt Lake City, Utah
[Dep. PL p. 41] ; and she stated to her own counsel that
she left this apartment sometime in either January or
February, 1964. [Dep. PL p. 40] Consequently the $100.00
payment was received prior to or during January or
February of 1964 and not after that period of time.
Based upon the foregoing statement of facts and the
other information gained from reading the depositions
of rbhe parties, the trial judge, Stewar,t M. Hanson, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. This
motion \Vas based upon the def ens es raised in the answer
of the defendants-spedfically the statute of limitations
as found in §78-12-25 UCA-1953 and the statute of frauds
found in §25-5-4 UCA-1953. [R. 2]
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT, GEORGE KOUNALIS, CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEBT OF JOHN
KOUNALLS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WRITTEN
AGREEMENT TO BECOME LIABLE AS REQUIRED
BY §25-5-4 (2) UCA-1953.
Secfion 25-5-4 (2) UCA-1953 states as follows:
6

"25-5-4. Certain Agreements Void Unless Written
and Subscribed. - In the following cases every
agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or
some note o.r memorandum thereof, i1s in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
... (2) Every promise to answer for the debt, def a ult, or miscarriage of another . . . ''
The plaintiff stated that all transactions with the
defendants were verbal. [Dep. PL p. 17] She further
stated that George Kounalis had never told her the money
she gave to John would be repaid. [Dep. PL p. 29] All of
her dealings were with John Kounalis; and nowhere did
she ever state that John had told her he had been asked
by George to get the money friom the plaintiff. [Dep. Pl.
pp. 12, 13, 20, 21] Under these circumstances it is clear
that the only person who would be liable-if indeed anyone is liable-would be the defendant, John Kounalis.
For 1these reasons the court was correct in dismissing
George Kounalis from the lawsuit.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT, JOHN KOUNALIS, HAD
NO LEGAL LIABILITY TO REPAY THE PLAINTIFF FOR MONIES ADVANCED BECAUSE ANY
CLAIM WHICH THE PLAINTIFF MIGHT HAVE
HAD WAS BARRED BY §78-12-25 UCA-1953.
Section 78-12-1 UCA-1953 provides that civil actions
oan be commenced only within the periods prescribed in
Chapter 12 and after the cause of act:iion .shall have accrued. The pertinent ·section of Chapter 12 which applies
to the instant ca·se is §78-12-25 which reads as follows:
7

"78-12-25. Within Four (4) Years. (1) An action
upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; ... provided
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be
oommenced at any time within four (4) years
after the last charge is made or the last payment
is received.''
The plaintiff testified that the loans were made to
John Kounalis in October of 1962 and January of 1963.
[Dep. Pl. pp. 9-10] The instant action was commenced
in August of 1968 or more than five and one-half (5112)
years after the last amount was given to John Kounalis.
It follows the complaint should be dismissed pursuant
to §78-12-25 unless the plaintiff can come within the provisions of §78-12-44 UCA-1953.
This latter section extends the time to bring suit to
four (4) years after: (1) any part of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or (2) an acknowledgment of
an existing liability shall have been made, or (3) a promise fo pay the existing liability shall have been made.
Subsections (2) and (3) require a writing signed by the
party to be charged thereby; and consequently these two
(2) subsections would not apply to the instant case where
all transactions were verbal. [Dep. PL p. 17]
w.hether suhseotion (1) of 78-12-44 applies depends
on the time and nature of the transactions. Plaintiff alleges the defendant, John Kounalis, made a payment on
account by letting the plaintiff charge groceries at his
store; and also because the defendant, George Kounalis,
paid $100.00 and $50.00 to the plaintiff. Since the gro8
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ceries were taken during 1963 and January and February, 1964, and f'-i.nce the $100.00 was paid during this
same period of time [Dep. PL pp. 40-41] ; it is obvious
each transaction was more than four ( 4) year·s prio·r to
the date the instant action was filed; and therefore would
I11ot be of any help to the plaintiff in extending the statute.
And both the plaintiff and John stated affirmatively that
they had absolutely no conta0t with each other since February, 1964. [Dep. PL p. 37 L. 8-10; Dep. JK p. 15 L.
1-3]
Nor can the $50.00 payment by George Kounalis in
1967 be construed as a part payment under §78-12-44.
Since George had no legal liability to repay the plaintiff
as shown under POINT I, supra, it follows any payments
he made were merely gratuitous and would be made as a
stranger to the contract between the plaintiff and John
Kounalis and therefore could not affect the statute of
limitations defense raised by John Kounalis.
The plaintiff does not contend that George acted as
the agent of John in paying the $50.00. Rather the plaintiff seekJs to hold George Kounalis liable personally in
this lawsuit because he received the benefit of some of the
money and she attempts to construe the $50.00 payment to
extend the statute of limitations as to George. This point
might have s•ome merit if George were liable in some
way; but it is obvious in the instant case he is not liable
except perhaps morally if he feels so inclined. His defense
under the statute of frauds [§25-5-4 (2) UCA-1953] negates his legal liabi'1ity and there is no way it can be
9

created by payment of $50.00 some five (5) years after
the monies were given to his brother without his knowledge. Furtherm<>re, it is clear that all the plaintiff's dealings were with John and she had no meeting of the mind
wiith George. Nowhere in the depo·sition of the parties is
there any suggestion that John and George were ever in
a joint venture and that John had acted as George's
agent in getting the money from the plaintiff. In fact,
the plaintiff herself admitted that she had no personal
knowledge that George even knew that John had gone
to the plaintiff for the money. [Dep. PL pp. 21, 24] ; and
George claims that the first he learned of the plaintiff's
participation was in March, 1963, after the loans had
already been made. [Dep. GK p. 10]
The final attempt which the plaintiff makes to overcome the statute of limitations defense is by saying that
the debt was not to be repaid for several years and therefore the "cause of action" contemplated by §78-12-1 did
not exist for several years. From this, she reasons that
the statute of limitations did not begin to run for several
years. The problem with this position is that the plaintiff
changed her story so many time-s the trial judge did not
have any credible, convincing, evidence to determine when
the repayment was to be made if at all, and the plaintiff
hel'lself admits as muc.h in her brief. When the plaintiff
fir.st ,stated her recollection of the initial conversation with
John Kounalis, she stated affirmatively that John had
said the money would be repaid in five or six years.
[Dep. PL p. 11] However, when she was asked later in
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the deposition to state again what she remembered about
this initial convel'sation, she changed her testimony and
remarked that John said it might be two, three or four
years. [Dep. Pl. p. 18] Under these circumstances, the
trial judge was certainly entitled to find that there was
no agreement as to time of repayment. In such a situation
the law holds that the loan was due when made and plaintiff could have made a demand for repayment at that
time. [Lindsey v. Hamlet, 235 Ala. 335, 170 So 234 (1938)]
Since the plaintiff could demand payment at any time
after the loans were made, the statute oflimitations would
begin to run from the same time according to plaintiff's
own authorities. and since the complaint was not filed until
more than five and one-half (5%) year's later, it is clear
the trial judge acted properly in dismissing the action.
It would not work any real hardship on the defendants to apply the above stated rule of law and find that
the loans were due when made ; or upon the demand of the
plaintiff. The trial judge had before him the depositions
of the parties which showed that George Kiounalis owned
stock which could have been sold to pay this indebtednes,s
and that he in fact did sell S'Ome of the stock and repaid
J,ohn approximately $1,000.00 in November of 1962. [Dep.
GK p. 9] The trial judge could also have found that the
defendant, John Kounalis, operated a grocery store and
had the ability to Tepay the money. He also had the state-

ment of the defendants to the effect that the o,ther brothers and siBters in the family could have raised the money
tio pay George's court cosits had it not been for the in11

tervention of the plaintiff. [Dep. JK pp. 9-10] Under
these circumstances, it is clear there would be no genuine is,sue of fact to be tried and the summary judgment
was properly granted.

SUMMARY
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the defendants submit that there i s no genuine issue of fact to be
tried and that the ruling of the tr~al judge should be
affirmed.
1

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
JAMES A. McINTOSH
Attorney for Responden.ts
15 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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